WW2 Arnhem Market Garden

A Magnificent Disaster

The Failure of Market Garden, The Arnham Operation September 1944

A Magnificent Disaster by David Bennett: This small icon is used elsewhere in my site as a link to this page!

The Failure of Market Garden, The Arnham Operation September 1944

With a foreword by Carlo D'Este

This 1st. edition published in 2008 in the USA and UK. by Casemate, Pennsylvania & Newbury.

ISBN: 978 1 932033 85 4

“A magnificent disaster” Arnhem certainly was. Need it have been? Did the Allies truly try to go “a bridge to far”? In a consideration of logistics, communications, intelligence and military culture, as well as leadership and tactical enterprise, David Bennett supplies some intriguing conclusions.

Book's condition and details:

A black cloth bound book with bright gilt lettering and motifs to the spine - No inscriptions - condition is at least NEAR FINE
Dust wrapper un-price clipped, whole and, again, in at least NEAR FINE condition.
A very nice copy!

Royal Mail prices for various destinations.
Prices correct from May 2015.
U.K. Included in price
Europe £5.50
World Zones 1 £7.70
World Zones 2 £8.45

286 pages. 160 mm. x 235 mmm. x 26 mm.

Weight unwrapped 541 grams

Weight wrapped for postage < 750 grams.

A Magnificent Disaster by David Bennett: A small flash photograph intended to show the general appearance.

Price: £6.00 including U.K. postage.
For postage to other countries see table!

Dust Wrapper blurbs:

Market Garden, the Arnhem Operation, is usually seen as a British attempt to gain a foothold across the Rhine, assisted by American and Polish airborne forces. So it was, David Bennett shows that the British effort was one arm of a proposed grand envelopment of the Ruhr Industrial Region, the other calling for another crossing of the Rhine to the south by the U.S. First Army.

There has been much complaint that the Arnhem Operation was a costly distraction from the campaign to clear the Scheldt Estuary and open the great port of Antwerp to Allied supply ships. In an entirely new interpretation, David Bennett argues that no one made an issue of the Scheldt Estuary in September 1944 and, in particular that was no “great mistake” in allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape from its positions along the Scheldt. It is not good idea to lock the Germans in the Scheldt Islands, and in any case, they had no intention of escaping to the mainland.

It has long been known that the Polish paratroop commander, Sosabowski, was shabbily treated by the British. Bennett’s research shows, conclusively, that Sosabowski and his valiant brigade, in a campaign of mendacious hostility, were blamed for the failure to reinforce the British airborne division cut off north of the Rhine, and how the British botched the relief efforts, while claiming afterwards that they should have adopted Sosabowski’s plan, which at the time they angrily rejected. In the end, the 2,400 British paratroopers who escaped were evacuated by a single company of Canadian engineers, a staggering achievement which has been almost totally hidden from history.

There are other heroes too. Bennett shows that the Operation would have failed at the outset but for the brilliant soldiery of the two American airborne divisions, who overcame a variety of odds to create a corridor for ground troops in their march to Arnhem.

“A magnificent disaster” Arnhem certainly was. Need it have been? Did the Allies truly try to go “a bridge to far”? In a consideration of logistics, communications, intelligence and military culture, as well as leadership and tactical enterprise, David Bennett supplies some intriguing conclusions.